Mercer Law Review
Volume 46
Number 2 Federal Judicial Independence
Symposium

Article 4

3-1995

Congress and the Courts: Establishing a Constructive Dialogue
Orrin G. Hatch

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Hatch, Orrin G. (1995) "Congress and the Courts: Establishing a Constructive Dialogue," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 46 : No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol46/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Congress and the Courts:
Establishing a Constructive
Dialogue
by Senator Orrin G. Hatch'
The topic of federal judicial independence is an amorphous one, and
Professor Redish's fine contribution to this symposium provides
meaningful shape and structure to this topic. I will leave it largely to
the academics to debate the many theoretical questions raised by
Professor Redish. At the outset, I would simply like to offer a few
observations on the four categories into which Professor Redish
subdivides the concept of federal judicial independence.
I agree with Professor Redish that what he labels "institutional"
independence, "decisional" independence, and "counter-majoritarian
independence identify those basic respects in which the Constitution
guarantees the federal courts protections from political intrusion. I must
also note that none, or virtually none, of the current political debate over
issues facing the federal courts relates to any of these three legitimate
aspects of judicial independence. No one worries that Congress will
attempt to reduce the compensation of sitting federal judges in violation
of Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution.1 Moreover, there is no
reason to fear that Congress will attempt to control, or interfere with,
the adjudication of specific cases or prevent the courts from addressing
the constitutionality of the laws they are enforcing. In short, while these
three types of independence raise a number of interesting academic
issues, they are not the source of any immediate controversy over alleged
threats to judicial independence.

* Chairman, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Chairman, Finance
Committee Subcommittee on Taxation. Brigham Young University (B-AL, 1959); University
of Pittsburgh (J.D., 1962).
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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The fourth subcategory, supposed"lawmaking" independence, is where
much of the current tension between Congress and the courts is rooted.
Professor Redish defines lawmaking independence as "the ability of the
federal courts to create either controlling substantive legal principles or
governing general rules of procedure in the course of individual
adjudications."2 I agree entirely with Professor Redish that judicial
claims to lawmaking independence are misplaced and that Congress has
full authority to prescribe procedural as well as substantive rules for the
federal courts. 8
I hasten to add that this does not mean that Congress should not
delegate its authority to promulgate procedural rules to the courts, nor
does it mean that Congress should not tap the experience and expertise
of federal judges. I, for one, welcome the opportunity to engage in
constructive dialogues with the judiciary, What it does mean, however,
is that disagreements that judges have with Congress over policy
matters involving the courts should not be transmogrified into supposed
threats to judicial independence. There will undoubtedly be many
instances in which Congress and the courts disagree on lawmaking
policy affecting the courts. The fact of disagreement no more means that
Congress is attacking judicial independence than it means that the
courts are seeking to aggrandize their own power. I therefore believe
that the label of "judicial independence" is an overbroad one insofar as
it is used to subsume the entire range of relations between Congress and
the courts.
Putting aside academic issues that genuinely involve judicial
independence, I would like to offer some reflections on two legislative
issues of concern to the federal judiciary: (1) federalization of traditionally state law matters, and (2) the size of the federal judiciary.

2. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERcER L. REV. 697, 699 (1995).

3. I am unpersuaded, however, by Professor Redish's view that Congress may not
establish procedural rules that operate in effect as an exception to a substantive rule of
decision. Redish, supra note 2, at 715-18. If Congress may prescribe both substantive and
procedural rules, how is judicial independence affected when Congress chooses one method
rather than the other to achieve a desired pelicy? Professor Redish claims that decisional
independence is undermined if Congress uses procedural means to achieve an exception
to a generalized substantive rule of decision. But so long as the procedural rules are not
designed to control or interfere with a particular case, decisional independence would
appear not to be at stake. Indeed, Professor Redish's concern that "public policies [would]
effectively be developed in disguise" indicates that it is broader concerns about open
government that underlie his objections. Id. at 718. I do not see what is not open, or
comprehensible to the general public, about a conclusive presumption (to use Professor
Redish's example of Michael H.), but in any event the concern seems to me to have nothing
to do with judicial independence.
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I am well aware of the growing hostility among judges over Congress's
tendency to federalize state crimes and civil causes of action. In fact,
one federal judge wrote an editorial in the New York 71mes that
characterized the original Senate-passed crime bill's proposals to
federalize certain firearms offenses and gang offenses as "superficial"
and "disingenuous." As one who supported some of these legislative
proposals, I have defended the Senate's decision to pass these measures.
There is a growing, sincere belief among many members of Congress
that federal prosecutors and federal courts should perhaps play a larger
role in addressing our nation's most serious domestic problem, the
growing epidemic of violent crime.
I regret that our efforts in the Senate aroused such a strong reaction
among many members of the judiciary. I take very seriously the views
of federal judges on matters affecting the administration of justice. In
fact, the strong voice of judges turned my attention to the need to return
some limited measure of flexibility in sentencing to district court judges
in criminal cases involving first-time, non-violent offenders. (The final
Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 contained a much
broader version of this proposal.5 ) I firmly believe, however, that the
need for the federal government to respond directly to the growing
epidemic of serious violent crime that plagues the streets of our cities
and towns far outweighs the interest on the part of some members of the
judiciary in trying only those cases for which they believe they are
uniquely qualified.
Having said this, I want to stress that I support the efforts being
initiated by Chief Judge Wallace of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and others to develop a set of guiding principles
that will assist policymakers as they arrive at decisions on whether
particular matters should be federalized. I also want to commend the
Attorney General of the United States for furthering the discussion of
this issue.
While it may well be that criminal trials are taking longer and judges
may be spending more time managing their criminal caseloads, the facts
do not appear to support claims that criminal cases are taking up a
disproportionate amount of federal filings. According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the criminal caseload per judge
is nearly fifty percent below that of 1972.! The number of criminal

4. Maryanne Trumnp Barry, Don't Make a Federal Case Of It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,

1994, at A31.
5. Pub. L. No. 103-222, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
6. CriminalTrialsDominateDistrictCourts'Workload, THE THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1993,
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cases reached a forty-year peak in 1972. Despite all of the discussion,
the number of criminal cases filed in 1992 was actually fourteen percent
below the 1972 figure. 7 In fact, for the first time in ten years, the
number of criminal cases fied decreased in 1993. There were fewer
criminal cases in federal courts in 1993 than there were in 1972, even
though the number of authorized judges is now sixty-two percent higher
than in 1993.' These figures reveal that the impact of any federalized
crime is largely dependent on the Executive Branch's willingness to
corral its resources toward the investigation and prosecution of these
offenses.
As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I am prepared to
work with the judiciary in an effort to delineate the respective spheres
of operation of federal and state law. My goal is not to shift the focus of
the federal judiciary away from those cases they are best equipped to
handle. Rather, I sincerely believe that all of us in the federal government must do more to fight violent crime. The battle against crime is,
in my view, a virtual prerequisite for success in other domestic policy
endeavors-the economy, education, and the environment. The security
of persons and property must be a priority of every level of government,
including the federal level.
Of course, it is also appropriate that Congress give the federal courts
the resources to handle the cases that Congress assigns them. This
point brings me to a second legislative issue: the size of the federal
judiciary.
Let me begin by emphasizing that increasing the number of federal
judges is but one means of coping with an expanded caseload. Other
alternatives might include giving the courts more law clerks, better
support services, or more advanced technologies. Similarly,judges might
be offered training to become more efficient at handling existing
workloads. We in Congress might also be persuaded to divest the
federal courts of a portion of their caseload. I do not intend to explore
these or other alternatives here. I mean only to highlight that increasing the number of federal judges is not the only possible response to a
mismatch between judicial resources and caseload. Nor is it obviously
the most cost-effective means: according to reports, the annual total cost
of a federal judgeship exceeds one million dollars.'

7. Id.
8. StatisticsReflect Active Year For Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANcH, Feb. 1994, at 4.
9. Richard B. Schmitt, PushForMore Judges Gains PoliticalSteam, WALL ST. J., Feb.
24, 1993 at 1312; Stephen Labaton, Clinton May Use Diversity Pledge to Remake Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at Al.
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Moreover, some prominent jurists have argued that increasing the
number of federal judges would create more problems than it would
solve. For example, Chief Judge Newman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has argued that expanding the judiciary
would inevitably lead to a decrease in the quality of judges, produce
larger appellate courts that would be less efficient, and fragment federal
case law.' Chief Judge Tjoflat of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit has made similar arguments against what he
calls "jumbo" appellate courts. In his words, "the problem for most
circuits is not that they have too few judges, but that they have too
many."" While I have not reached any firm conclusion on the merits
of these arguments, it is clear that they warrant careful consideration.
In any event, even ifjudicial expansion were warranted at some point,
it would be necessary to determine precisely how many judgeships
should be added. Given the high costs associated with each additional
judgeship, this is a calculation that should not be made hastily.
A fundamental problem with determining whether, and how many,
additional judgeships are necessary is that the judicial system has not
been operating at anything close to full capacity. There are currently
649 authorized district court judgeships and 179 authorized circuit court
judgeships. ' But as recently as January 1993, 113 of these judicial
seats-more than 13.6% of the total-were vacant.' s As ranking
Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee. during the 103rd
Congress, I worked together with the Clinton Administration and with
Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to expedite
confirmation of qualified judicial nominees. As a result of the extraordinary cooperation of Republicans on the Judiciary Committee, we were
able to confirm 129 federal judges-two for the Supreme Court, nineteen
for the courts of appeals, and 108 for the district courts-an all-time
record for a President's first two years in office. Nonetheless, there
remained at the beginning of this Congress fifty-three vacancies-a full
6.4% of the lower court seats-including vacancies in a number of
positions created by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.14 In
addition, it will be some time before recent appointees are operating at
full speed, especially since so many of the President's confirmed

10. Jon 0. Newman, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough?; Yes, More Would Dilute the
Quality, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1993, at A17.
11. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the
FederalJudiciary,A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70.
12. Conference Act on Courtroom Cameras,THE THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1994, at 2.
13. JudicialBoxecore, THE THI BRANCH, Feb. 1993, at 5.
14. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
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nominations were made (and were therefore confirmed) only very late in
the 103rd Congress.
It is also not at all clear that recent legislation will significantly
impact the caseload of the federal courts. With all respect, I must note
that the record of the judicial branch in estimating the impact of
legislation on the courts' caseload is mixed at best. For example, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts estimated that
Congress's decision in 1992 to federalize child support obligations would
result in an estimated 500 additional criminal cases per year in the
federal courts. In fact, however, according to United States Sentencing
Commission data, there has not been a single felony conviction for this
offense.
Inc sum, in addressing the size of the judiciary, there are numerous
serious issues that Congress must carefully address and evaluate. In
considering these and other issues, I welcome the input and expertise of
federal judges, and I welcome the opportunity for a constructive
dialogue.

